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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, State of Utah, and accordingly jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 1994).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of the issue. Whether the trial court properly granted declaratory relief on
motion for summary judgment that Troy Pino was covered under the West American Insurance
Company (West American) policy at the time and place of the accident at issue.
Standard of review. The question of whether a driver is a permissive user and thus
covered under an insurance policy is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
Dairvland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.. 882 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1994). This
matter was decided on summary judgment, and this Court may affirm the trial court on any
appropriate basis. Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "[W]e
may affirm or grant summary judgment on any ground, even one not relied upon by the trial
court." K&T. Inc. v. Korodis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND ORDINANCES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-21-107(2) and 31A-22-303(l)(b)(i) are determinative in this
matter and have been fully reproduced in Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. West American initiated this action for declaratory relief seeking to
determine the rights of the parties under an automobile insurance policy. See Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment (R. 30). Specifically, West American prayed:
For declaratory judgment of this court in its favor, and against the defendants, declaring
that defendant Troy J. Pino is not an insured under the West American Insurance
Company policy insuring Harold and Rosalee Pino, and that Plaintiff has no duty to
defend or indemnify Troy J. Pino in any action brought against Pino arising out of his use
of the motor vehicle on February 5, 1995[.]
See Complaint (R. 28). Subsequently, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(State Farm) intervened. Both West American and State Farm filed motions for summary
judgment on the issue of coverage. (R. 85 and R. 89). The court denied West America's motion
and granted State Farm's motion, (R. 215) and a final judgment against West America was
entered. (R. 220). This appeal followed.
Statement of facts. The factual record in this matter is comprised of the insurance policy
at issue (R. 25) and the depositions of Harold Pino (R. 171), Rosalee Pino (R. 159), and Troy J.
Pino (R. 137). The motor vehicle accident at issue occurred on February 5, 1995. Troy J. Pino,
who was twenty-four years old at the time, did not reside with his parents, but he did have a key
to their home and unrestricted access to it at any time. (R. 29). On February 5, 1995, Troy
arrived at his parents' home while they were away. Being in need of a vehicle, Troy took the
keys to his parents Ford Ranger from a board where his parents kept the keys to all of their
vehicles, and while traveling in the vehicle Troy was involved in an accident with Appellees
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Jeffs and the Abbotts. The vehicle was insured by a policy naming Harold and Rosallee Pino
insureds with West American Insurance Company. (R. 30). The West American policy
provides:
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which any "insured"
becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.
(R. 20). Insured is defined as, among other things, "any person using 'your covered auto'".
(R. 20). Under exclusions, the West American policy provides:
We do not provide liability coverage for any "insured":
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that "insured" is entitled to
do so.
The policy itself does not define "reasonable belief nor "entitled" in any way.
The depositions of the Pino family show that Troy J. Pino is the son of Harold and
Rosalee Pino. Harold Pino testified that all of his children, including Troy J. Pino, know the
combination for the lock on the garage through which they can access the home through the
kitchen. (R. 116). Troy Pino also had a key to his parents'home. kL Harold Pino stated "[M]y
children are free to use my automobiles if it is a necessity." Id,
In answer to the question, "Do you believe that Troy had your permission to use the
vehicle on the day of the accident," Harold Pino responded: "Like I said yes. I never did tell
him not to." (R. 165). When the Pinos saw that their car was missing on the day of the accident,
they assumed that one of their kids had taken it. (R. 164). Rosalee Pino explained that the family
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has a board with hooks on it that is near the kitchen door and all the keys to their vehicles hang
on it, including the vehicle which was involved in the accident at issue.
(R. 152). Because the keys were gone and the kids had access to the home, Mrs. Pino assumed
that one of her children had taken the vehicle involved in the accident. (R. 150-51).
Mrs. Pino acknowledged that she had never before this accident told Troy that he could
not use any of their vehicles. (R. 146). Additionally, the following discourse with Mrs. Pino
took place:
Question: Have you ever given Troy permission to use his vehicles whenever he comes
up to an emergency or needs one for some reason or another.
Answer: Usually.
Question: If he has asked first you said no problem that he can usually use them.
Answer: Right.
(R. 144). Mrs. Pino stated that Troy had in fact driven the Ford Ranger prior to this accident. (R.
143). Mrs. Pino stated that there has never been an occasion where Troy has used one of their
vehicles and she told him afterwards that he should not have used it. (R. 141).
Troy Pino stated in his deposition that his parents had not ever told him not to use their
vehicles and that his parents knew that he knew where the keys to their vehicles were. (R. 128).
Troy Pino testified that the keys to his parents' automobiles had been located in their place in the
kitchen for years, including the period in which he lived with his parents at home. (R. 127-28).
Troy Pino could not remember any occasion where his parents denied him permission to use
their vehicles. (R. 127). In Troy Pino's deposition, the following exchange took place:
Question: You were here when your Dad testified that if you needed it it was okay to use
his vehicle. Did you hear him say that?
4

Answer: Yes.
Question: Did you understand that before you said it today?
Answer: Yes.
(R. 127).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment was properly granted in this case because reasonable minds could not
differ that Troy Pino had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents vehicle at the
time and place of the accident. Alternatively, Troy Pino is insured under the West American
Policy pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994). Summary judgment was
proper because the question of whether a driver is a permissive user, and the interpretation of
insurance policy language, are both questions of law to be decided by the trial court. Although
these questions of law are mixed with factual issues, because those factual issues are so clear that
reasonable minds could differ, this case was properly decided on motion for summary judgment.
The West American policy exclusion is inapplicable in this matter because Troy Pino had
a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents' vehicle. His belief was reasonable
based on his relationship with his parents, his past use of their vehicles, and the fact that his
parents had indicated that all of their children were free to use their vehicles. At no time
previous to this accident had Troy Pino's parents ever told him he could not use their vehicles.
There is simply no evidence whatsoever that permission had never been granted to Troy to use
the vehicle. Even accepting West American's policy provision as an objective standard, Troy
Pino met that standard and therefore was entitled to coverage.
5

However, as numerous courts have found, the exclusion upon which West American
relies is clearly ambiguous. The policy itself in no way defines the terms "reasonable belief or
"entitled." Both terms are open to innumerable definitions and interpretations. In the end, it is
basically an untenable position to assert that any person not well versed in insurance subtleties or
the law could understand whether coverage would exist in this case. In any event, Troy Pino did
have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents vehicle. As a result, the trial court
must be affirmed.
Alternatively, to hold as West American invites this court would ignore Utah law. Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-107(2)(1994) mandates that any provision of any insurance policy which
does not comply with the insurance code shall be construed as if the policy language did in fact
apply. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994) mandates that all personal automobile
insurance policies insure any person using a named motor vehicle with express or implied
permission of the named insured. In this case, Troy Pino arguably had the express permission of
his parents to use their vehicle. At a minimum, reasonable minds could not differ that he had at
least the implied permission of his parents to use the vehicle in question. Based upon the present
and past conduct of use by Troy Pino of his parents' vehicle, their lack of objection to his use
under any circumstances, and the family's practice of leaving the keys on key-hooks where any
of their children were free to use the vehicles, all point to the conclusion that Troy Pino as a child
of Harold and Rosalee Pino had the implied permission to use their vehicles at his discretion. As
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a result, summary judgment in this matter should be affirmed and the West American policy
construed so as to conform to applicable Utah Law.
ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CASE
The question of whether a driver is a permissive user, and thus covered under an

insurance policy, is a question of law. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 882 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1994). Of course, there may be factual issues which a court must
resolve in order to reach a determination of whether implied or express permission can be found.
Nonetheless, where factual issues are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ, an issue
may be properly decided as a matter of law. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057
(Utah 1989) (summary judgment granted as to whether actions came within the course and scope
of employment). See also Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992); Olympus
Hills Shopping Center Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
The interpretation of insurance policy language presents a question of law to be decided
by the trial judge using accepted methods of construction. Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664,
665 (Utah 1992). In this regard, insurance policies are contracts and are interpreted under the
same general rules applicable to other contracts. Gee v. Utah State Retirement Board. 842 P.2d
919, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nonetheless, "since 1921 this court has expressed its
commitment to the principle that 'insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the
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insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance.'" U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993) (quoting Richards v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co.. 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 1020 (1921)).1 A corollary to this rule is that "the
insured is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the policy."
Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co.. 21 Utah 2d 131, 135,442 P.2d 26, 28 (Utah 1968).2 All
ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer and are "resolved in favor of
coverage." Hill v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 888 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Nielsen
v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1992)). In like fashion, the terms and conditions of an
insurance policy are strictly construed in favor of the insured. Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co.. 851 P.2d 647, 651 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Most
specifically, provisions that limit or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against the
insurer. Sandt. 854 P.2d at 523.
In this case, Troy Pino was covered under the West American policy both (1) because he
had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to drive his parents' truck and (2) because he was an
insured person under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994) which mandates that
personal automobile insurance policies in the State of Utah "insure any other person using any
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured[.]"
1

The Sandt court explained that this fundamental rule is based on the fact that an
insurance policy is a classic example of an adhesion contract where the terms are not negotiated
by the insured and the insurer, but that the policy is usually offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Sandt. 854 P.2d at 522.
2

This rule was also reiterated in the Sandt decision, 854 P.2d at 522.
8

II.

WEST AMERICAN'S POLICY EXCLUSION IS INAPPLICABLE; TROY PINO
HAD A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO USE HIS
PARENTS' VEHICLE
As previously quoted, under the exclusion heading of the liability coverage of the Pino

vehicle, the policy provides:
We do not provide liability coverage for any "insured":
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that "insured" is entitled
to do so.
The policy itself in no way defines the terms "reasonble belief or "entitled." In construing
almost identical language, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Heflin.
727 P.2d 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) held:
The exclusion at issue here is clearly ambiguous, as shown by the divergent
interpretations given to it by the parties and the trial court.
Id at 31. A court of appeals in the State of Washington agreed in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Davis, 721 P.2d 550 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). The Safeco court pointed out that the policy
provided no indication as to the meaning of "reasonable belief or "entitled." Id at 552. The
court looked to Webster's Third New International Dictionary for a definition of "entitled" and
found that it meant among other things "to give a right or legal title to: qualify (one) for
something: furnish with proper grounds for seeking a claim in something." Id The Safeco court
rightly reasoned:
Several reasonable interpretations of "entitled" are possible within the scope of being
exclusionary language. One is "permission" or "consent," which focusses on the
9

relationship between the driver and the owner of the vehicle. Another equally plausible
interpretation of "entitled," apparently that urged by Safeco, is "legal authority," which
focuses on a variety of relationships that arise between the driver and the state. Safeco
places special stress on the fact that [the driver] did not have a driver's license. In
addition, "entitled" could encompass both "consent" and "legal authority." The
ambiguity and uncertainty of [the exclusion] are exacerbated by the broad range of
situations to which the clause might apply. The average person consulting the policy
would have difficulty assertaining the extent of coverage.3
Id at 552.
Upon this basis the Safeco court found that a fourteen year old girl without a driver's license
could have a reasonable belief that she was entitled to use a vehicle. Construing the exclusionary
language in favor of the insured and coverage, the court found that the exclusion was not
applicable.
West American relies almost exclusively on the case of Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Johnson. 738 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, the Johnson case calls for no
reversal in this matter as a trial court below pointed out:
[T]he particular ruling of Judge Fredrickson [sic] quoted in the opinion was not one of the
issues before the court. The only issues reviewed by the court of appeals in that case
were (1) negligent entrustment and (2) negligence because of an alleged joint enterprise.
(R. 206). Careful reading of the Johnson case shows that in any event, even if the court in
Johnson had reviewed the matter under the reasonable belief language, there would be many
other bases on which to hold that Mr. Johnson did not have a reasonable belief that he was
3

Likewise the court in State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis. 700 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985) found:
The policy does not specify whether "entitled" means simply obtaining permission from
the owner of the vehicle or whether a valid license from the applicable state would also
be required to avoid exclusion from coverage.
10

entitled to use the vehicle, whereas in this case, Troy Pino did. In Johnson. Mr. Johnson had
been expressly denied permission by the daughter of the vehicle's owner. The parents had
instructed their daughter not to lend the vehicle to anyone else. Mr. Johnson took the keys to the
vehicle without permission and therefore could not have reasonably believed he was entitled to
use the vehicle. In contrast, all the witnesses in this matter are unanimous that Troy J. Pino had
never been denied permission to use the vehicle at issue, or any of his parents' vehicles. His
parents indicated that they had let him use the vehicle on earlier occasions and had never told
him he could not. In fact, when they found the vehicle missing on the day of the accident they
assumed that one of their children had taken it, indicating a rather liberal approach to the use of
the vehicles where their children were concerned.
It is interesting to note that the appellate court in Johnson did not criticize the trial court's
finding that the daughter of the owner of the vehicle at issue had "reasonably entrusted" the
vehicle to a second permittee, one of her friends, who she knew did not have a license. I d at
654. This second permittee had been drinking and was in fact given the keys to the vehicle in
order to go obtain mixers for a party all of the persons involved were attending. In short, the
Johnson decision is inapplicable, unhelpful, and certainly not precedent in determining this
matter.
The ambiguity of the language chosen by West American is even more highlighted by the
federal court's decision of Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. F & G. 663 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Ark. 1987)
which West American itself characterizes as "[p]erhaps the best case on the issue" and
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"extremely well reasoned." See Appellant's Brief at 8. In that decision, Judge Waters defined
the term "entitled" as "had permission." Allstate. 663 F.Supp. at 554. Judge Waters reviewed
those decisions which had found that the words "using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that
the person is entitled to do so" had not excluded coverage for minors without driver's licenses.
Id at 553. Judge Waters found that the facts of the Allstate case were distinguishable, and
therefore Judge Waters did not discredit nor criticize the precedent which held that persons
without a driver's license can nonetheless have a reasonable belief that they are entitled to use an
automobile.
The true holding of the court in Allstate is that a driver cannot have a reasonable belief
that he is entitled to use a vehicle when that driver basically steals the vehicle. In Allstate, the
driver took the keys to the vehicle while the owner was sleeping. Where the evidence showed
that no one had ever used that vehicle without obtaining permission, the driver in Allstate failed
to seek permission. The court found that there was no substantial relationship between the driver
and the owner and no real history of prior use of the vehicle in question. Thus, the Allstate
decision hinged in fact on whether express or implied permission could be found, not whether a
person can have a reasonable belief that they are allowed to use a vehicle when they are drunk.
Given Judge Waters's review of the case law, it would appear that he would concur that one can
have a reasonable belief that they can use the vehicle when they do not have a driver's license,
and more pointedly, the Allstate case is in fact extremely well reasoned in that it equates
entitlement with permission. As a result, West American may be correct in asserting that the best
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case on the issue is the Allstate decision. If viewed as precedent, the Allstate decision in fact
would mandate coverage in this case.
Furthermore, a court of appeals in Louisiana found that "reasonable belief can actually
be more broad than actual permission. In Francois v. YbarzabaL 469 So.2d 1001 (La. Ct. App.
1985), a fifteen year old boy went to visit one of his friends named Steven. Steven's sister Kim
answered the door and spoke with the boy briefly and then went to the back of the house to clean
up her room. She left the keys to her car on a sofa, apparently in an area to which the boys had
access. At some point the young man picked up the keys and went outside to take a joyride.
While he admitted that at the time he had no permission, he stated that after he went around the
block once, another friend jumped in the car and told him that Kim said it was okay to drive the
car as long as he put some gas in. He saw Kim standing at the door and she did not say or do
anything, and as a result he thought he had permission. Kim's testimony at trial was that when
she saw the vehicle leaving she rushed back into the house for her brother Steven to help her try
to stop the car. Under these facts a jury answered a specific interrogatory finding that at the time
of the accident the young man reasonably believed he had permission to use the vehicle.
Accordingly, the court found that no permission was required for coverage under the State Farm
policy at issue, but only a "reasonable belief that he had such permission. Id at 1004.
In the present case, West American Insurance Company could have chosen a more
exacting standard for determining whether coverage would apply in a case such as the present
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one.4 Instead, West American chose an absolutely subjective standard which asks "what is going
on in the insured's mind?" In this case, the insured Troy Pino had used the vehicle before, had
never been denied permission, believed he was free to use his parents' vehicle, and his parents
themselves stated that they assumed that one of their children had taken the vehicle when they
found it to be missing. Thus, under West American's own policy language, Troy Pino did
believe he was entitled to use his parents' vehicles. Further, based upon his relationship with his
parents, his past use of their vehicles, and the fact that his parents had indicated all of their
children were free to use their vehicles, reasonable minds could not differ that Troy Pino's belief
was reasonable. West American's only real contention in this case is that because Troy Pino
lacked a driver's license, he could not have "reasonably" believed he was entitled to use the
vehicle.
However, West American's interpretation of their contract rests upon assumptions and
interpretations which simply are not found in the insurance policy itself. West American's
conclusion assumes that "entitled" means "legally authorized." There is absolutely no basis for
this assumption. Additionally, West America's conclusion assumes that the term "belief
encompasses a correct understanding of the law. However, it is patently obvious that belief

4

More exacting language is not unknown to insurance companies. The policy provisions
and exclusions can mandate "express permission." Mutual Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Hambleton.
733 P.2d 948 (Or. 1987). Likewise, an insurance company could limit coverage to those "legally
operating" motor vehicles. Meat v. Miller, 17 P.2d 32 (Wash. 1932). Of course, such policy
language would violate Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i) and 31A-21-107(2)(1994).
14

could easily encompass facts or conclusions which are untrue. In this regard, reasonable belief
can be in fact considered more broad than express or implied permission.
In any event, the relationship between Troy Pino and the State of Utah is not at issue.
Nowhere in the policy is coverage restricted to those who have valid driver's licenses. In fact, as
the trial court recognized in its Memorandum Decision, "The court is of the opinion that whether
or not the State of Utah authorized such use is immaterial. If the insurance company wished to
limit coverage to only licensed drivers, such a provision could have been very easily inserted by
the insurance company." (R. 205). The term "entitle" in this matter might easily distinguish
between rightful posession of an automobile and theft. Where one is in rightful possession of an
automobile, meaning that they have obtained the permission of the owner of that vehicle to drive
the vehicle, then they can be found to reasonably believe they are entitled to use it. In contrast, if
one has obtained the vehicle illegally through theft, they would not have a reasonable belief that
they were entitled to use the vehicle. This in fact was the critical issue of the Allstate decision
discussed earlier and characterized as the best case on the issue by West American. In the final
analysis, the terms "entitled" and "reasonable belief in this case are ambiguous, and as a result
it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. As the Safeco court noted:
[I]f Safeco intended simply to exclude coverage for unlicensed and underage drivers, it
could have done so in clear terms. (Citation omitted) An insurer is free to cut off
liability, with clear language, "but it cannot do so with [language] dulled by ambiguity."
Safeco. 721 P.2d at 553 (quoting Aetna Casualty Ins. Co.v. Haas. 422 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1968)).
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The purpose of the insurance statutes in the State of Utah is to protect innocent members
of the general public injured on the highway through the negligence of financially irresponsible
motorists. Peterson v. Western Casualty Ins. Co.. 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769, 771 (1967).
West American's brief highlights the misfocused view of the law they wish this Court to take.
The appellant argues:
It should be the law of this state that people who don't have a driver's license because it
has been revoked for DUI and who have also been drinking on the day in question, do not
have a "reasonable belief they are entitled to drive.
See Appellant's Brief at 7. West American claims that the state's public policy is best served by
denying coverage. However, the relationship being viewed in the present case is not one
between Troy Pino and the State of Utah. Instead, the question to be answered by this Court is
whether an insurance policy which was purchased to fulfill the financial responsibility laws of
the State of Utah should be enforced to protect innocent members of the general public injured
on the highways through the negligence of others. To answer that question, the Court must look
to the relationship between the owners of the vehicle and their son.
Troy Pino had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents' vehicle because
he had used it previously with no objection from his parents. He knew that his parents hung the
keys to their vehicles in a conspicuous place where all of their children could use the vehicles if
needed. There is simply no evidence before the trial court on which reasonable minds could
differ that Troy J. Pino had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents' vehicle.
The trial court must be affirmed.
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III. COVERAGE IN THIS MATTER IS MANDATED BY UTAH LAW
To hold as West American invites this Court would ignore Utah law. The controlling
statute in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994) which provides in pertinent
part that any personal automobile insurance policy written in the State of Utah must "insure any
other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named
insured[.]" If West American's chosen exclusion language is construed to be more narrow that
the statute, then the statute must control. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-107(2)(1994)
provides:
Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after July 1,1986, and which is
otherwise valid, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the
requirements of this title, is not rendered invalid by this title. However, those conditions
and provisions shall be construed and applied as if the policy, rider, or endorsement was
in full compliance with this title.
The policy in this case was issued for a period of October 21,1994 through February 21, 1995.
(R. 25). As a result, Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-107(2) is applicable and compels coverage in this
case.5
Reasonable minds could not differ that Troy Pino had permission, at least implied
permission, that he could use his parents' vehicles. It can easily be argued that since all
witnesses agreed that Harold and Rosalee Pino had communicated to their children that they
could use their vehicles, express permission had been granted in this case.

5

Cf. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993) (insurance clauses
violating statutory provisions are invalid).
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Implied permission may arise as a product of the present or past conduct of the insured,
and the relationship between the parties, including the lack of any objection to the use by
the permittee, which signifies acquiescence or consent of the insured, and is usually
shown by such usage and practice of the parties over a sufficient period of time prior to
the day in which the insured car was being used, as would indicate to a reasonable mind
that the permittee had the right to assume permission under the particular circumstances.
12 Couch, Couch on Insurance. 2d Ed. § 45:352, p. 697-99 (1981).
"Implied permission is found when the insured does not expressly give his consent but
consent is implied by his conduct, including lack of objection." Greuger v. Western Casualty
Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1976). All the indicia of implied permission exists in this case.
There is a significant relationship between the parties. In Steele v. NageL 406 P.2d 805 (Idaho
1965), the Idaho Supreme Court quoted a district court from California:
Where the issue of implied permissive use is involved, the general relationship existing
between the owner and the operator is of paramount importance. Where, for example, the
parties are related by blood [cases cited], or marriage [case cited], or where the
relationship between the owner and the operator is that of principal and agent [cases
cited], weak or direct evidence will support a finding of such use than where the parties
are only acquaintances [case cited], or strangers [cases cited].
Id. at 809 (quoting Elkinton v. California State Auto Association. Int. Ins. Bur.. 343 P.2d 396,
399 (Cal.Ct.App. 1959)).
Troy Pino was the son of Harold and Rosalee Pino. He had lived in their home for a
number of years and driven their vehicles. Certainly, of all of the circumstances in which
implied permissive use may apply, none is more common nor more expected and foreseeable
than that of a child using his parents' vehicle.
Likewise, there existed present and past conduct of use by Troy Pino of his parents'
vehicle. They never objected to his use under any circumstances. The family had a practice of
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leaving the key to their vehicles on key-hooks, which was a practice when Troy lived in their
home. Troy, and apparently the other children in the Pino family, had used the parents' vehicles.
All of the children knew the combination to the garage, and therefore they could access not only
the garage, but the keys in the kitchen as well. Troy had used this specific vehicle on earlier
occasions. And at no time had his parents ever told him he could not use the vehicle, and when
he had used the vehicle in the past, he had never returned to find out that his parents were
dismayed or objected to his use of their vehicles. His parents' attitude towards the use of their
vehicle is summed up and reflects their course of conduct when they returned home and assumed
that since the car was missing, one of their kids had taken it.
There has never been a contention by West American Insurance Company that Troy did
not have the permission of his parents to drive the vehicle. Although Utah law is explicit that
policies of insurance must cover instances of impleid permission, West American has chosen to
wholly ignore the applicable statutory provisions in both its policy and brief. (R. 190). Given
the evidence before the court, reasonable minds could not differ that Troy Pino had permission,
at least implied, to use his parents' vehicles. As a result, Troy was a covered person pursuant to
Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994), and therefore he was covered by the West
American policy at the time and place of the accident at issue. Summary judgment in this matter
must be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
West American's policy exclusion is inapplicable to the present matter because Troy Pino
had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his parents' vehicle. Even if this Court were to
find that a reasonable belief did not exist, coverage in this matter exists nonetheless pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l) (b)(i)(1994). Accordingly, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Company was entitled to summary judgment, and the trial court should therefore be affirmed.
DATED AND SIGNED this /J>^4rv of July, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A
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31A-21-107. Contract rights under noncomplying policies.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by this title, a policy is enforceable against
the insurer according to the terms, even if it exceed the authority of the insurer.
(2) Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after July 1,1986, and which
is otherwise valid, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the
requirements of this title, is not rendered invalid by this title. However, those conditions
and provisions shall be construed and applied as if the policy, rider, or endorsement was in
full compliance with this title.
(3) Upon written request of the policyholder or an insured whose rights under the policy
are continuing and not transitory, an insurer shall reform and reissue or amend by a clearly stated
rider its written policy to comply wit the requirements of the law existing at the date of issuance
of the policy. Subject to this section and Section 31A-21-102, a person seeking to reform a
written insurance agreement by complaint or petition to a judicial authority shall show by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of facts establishing the reformation.

31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage.
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter
22, a policy of a motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) shall:
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the policy was
purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium
charged, the policy period, and the limits of liability;
(b) (i) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the motor
vehicles on which coverage is granted, insured the person named in the policy,
insure any other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or
implied permission of the named insured, and, except as provided in
Subsection (7), insure any person included in Subsection (l)(c) against loss from
the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United States and Canada,
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in
amounts not less that the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as insured against loss
from the liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of the
insured's use of any motor vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial
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limits and with the same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under
Subsection (l)(b)(i); and
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to the named insured
by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the named
insured's household, including those who usually make their home in the same
household but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same extent as the named
insured.
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(l)(a)may:
(a) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that policy with other valid
and collectible insurance;
(b) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the required motor vehicle liability
coverage;
(c) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor vehicle business, limit the
coverage afforded to a motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees
to the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when
there is no other valid and collectible insurance with at least those limits, whether
the other insurance is primary, excess, or contingent.
(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability:
(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title 35;
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of the named insured,
other than a domestic employee, while engaged in the employment of the insured,
or while engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle;
or
(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, bailed to, or transported
by the insured.
(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability coverage has the right to settle
any claim covered by the policy, and if the settlement is made in good faith, the amount of the
settlement is deductible from the limits of liability specified under Section 31A-22-304.
(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage imposes on the insurer the duty
to defend, in good faith, any person insured under the policy against any claim or suit seeking
damages which would be payable under the policy.
(6) (a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage provides an insurer with the
defense of lack of cooperation of the part of the insured, that defense is not
effective against a third person making a claim against the insurer, unless there
was collusion between the third person and the insured,
(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective against the claimant, after
payment, the insurer is subrogated to the injured person's claim against the
insured to the extent of the payment and is entitled to reimbursement by the
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insured after the injured third person has been made would with respect to the
claim against the insured.
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l) may
specifically exclude from coverage a person who is a resident of the named insured's household,
including a person who usually makes his home in the same household but temporarily lives
elsewhere, if each person excluded from coverage satisfies the owner's or operator's severity
requirements of Section 41-12a-301, independently of the named insured's proof of owner's or
operator's security.
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